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Wisconsin v. Rewolinski: Do Members of the Deaf
Community Have a Right to be Free from
Search and Seizure of Their TDD Calls?
Stephanie Hoit Lee*
Introduction
On the night of June 9, 1987, Robert Rewolinski killed his
girlfriend, Catherine Teeters.' During Rewolinski's trial, the
judge admitted into evidence two printed transcripts of Telecom-
munications Device for the Deaf (TDD) phone calls made between
Rewolinski and Teeters.2 Under United States Supreme Court
precedent, the admission of this evidence violated the Fourth
Amendment.
Because Rewolinski and Teeters were both deaf3 and non-
verbal, they needed to use TDD machines4 to communicate by tel-
* Stephanie Hoit Lee received a BA from the University of Wisconsin,
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May 1993. She is wishes to thank Mr. Jeffrey J. Kassel for providing her with the
briefs of the case and Mr. David Moss for starting her on the track of this article.
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Brown, Professor Richard Frase, Mr. Mark P. Melchert and Mr. Wayne Rice for
their editorial advice and assistance. Special thanks to Mr. Glen D. Lee for all his
support and computer help. Any remaining mistakes are purely the author's own.
1. See Wisconsin v. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d 401, 403 (1990).
2. 1& at 404.
3. The author of this Comment has chosen to use the term "deaf" rather than
"hearing impaired" because it is her understanding that many people who do not
hear do not like to think of themselves as "disabled," "handicapped" or "impaired."
See CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, DEAF IN AMERICA: VOICES FROM A CUL-
TURE 43-44 (1988). Deaf people tend to refer to themselves by terms such as "dis-
abled," only when it is necessary to ally themselves with other groups in order to
fight for legislation or other benefits. I& There is, among deaf people, a distinction
between the word "deaf," which means an individual who cannot hear and the
word "Deaf," which refers to a culture having unique characteristics and a unique
language-American Sign Language. Id at 2-4.
4. A TDD (Telecommunications Device for the Deaf) is a machine which al-
lows typed messages to be transmitted to another TDD machine through ordinary
telephone lines. The messages show up on a small screen on the TDD machine.
Some models also transmit a printed transcript of the call. People who use the
TDD machines often also require "sound-sensitive visual alarms," which flash
lights to let the person know that the telephone or the doorbell is ringing. SUSAN
REZEN, PH.D. & CARL HAUSMEN, COPING WITH HEARING LOSS: A GUIDE FOR
ADULTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 119-20 (1985). Some people refer to TDD machines as
TTYs (Teletypewriters). This term was used for older models which were bigger
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ephone. Although prior precedent had established hearing per-
sons' rights to privacy in their telephone calls, the Rewolinski
decision indicates that deaf persons may not be afforded the
equivalent privacy protection.
On the day of Teeters' death, Rewolinski was stopped by
Pierce County (Wisconsin) sheriff's deputies as he was driving.
The deputies arrested Rewolinski for driving on a suspended li-
cense and took him to the sheriff's department. Upon his release,
Rewolinski requested to use the department's TDD machine5 to
call Teeters to drive him home. He was permitted to use the TDD
which was located in a limited access area.6 Two separate phone
conversations took place between Teeters and Rewolinski on the
sheriff department's TDD. During the course of the first call,
Rewolinski called Teeters for a ride home from the station and
Teeters initially refused to pick him up. Later, Teeters called
Rewolinski back on the department's TDD. During this second
call, Teeters consented to drive Rewolinski home on the condition
that he would not harm her or their children. When Rewolinski
attempted to leave the limited access area with these printouts, the
dispatcher, Deputy Sheriff Sandra Roed, forcibly took them from
his hand.7 These printouts indicated Teeters' fear of Rewolinski
and referred to his previous assault on her.8 At his trial and on
and heavier and did not have a visual display screen. TDDs are newer, lighter ma-
chines which have a visual display screen. People now use the terms "TDD" and
"TTY" interchangeably. BERYL LIEFF BENDERLY, DANCING WITHOUT Music: DEAF-
NESS IN AMERICA 237-38 (1980). The author of this Comment will use the term
TDD throughout.
5. The machine at the sheriff's department had a visual display which dis-
played one-half inch characters. The machine also had a feature which printed a
transcript of the call. This feature could be turned off by pushing a privacy button.
Not all machines have such a feature. The court record does not say whether
Rewolinski's home machine had such a feature. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 404.
Federal law requires federally assisted programs to have a TDD available. 28
C.F.R. §§ 42.501-42.540 (1991).
6. The TDD was located in the dispatch area. In order to get into this area, a
dispatcher had to unlock the door and let Rewolinski enter. The dispatcher was in
this room at all times during Rewolinski's calls. Rewolin.ski, 464 N.W.2d at 404.
7. The dispatcher, Deputy Sheriff Sandra Roed admitted that she had to force
open Rewolinski's hand when he refused to give her the printouts. Id at 404.
8. The printouts recorded Teeters statement, "I am scared to death that you
will make us die in car accident." Also appearing on the printouts is the fact that
Teeters had made Rewolinski promise that he would not hurt her or the children.
I& at 404. On the printouts there was also reference to a previous assault.
Rewolinski said to Teeters, "if the kids want daddy or not, okay. He said smiling, I
love you any more since I learned myself on May 4 that I hit your ear and shoulder
and understand about how you are feeling." Transcript at 364, Wisconsin v.
Rewolinski (No. 87 CR 155) (1987). It does not appear in the record whether
Rewolinski was ever arrested or tried for this assault. As will be discussed later,
the reason for the lack of clarity in some the language of Teeter's and Rewolinski's
calls is that both Rewolinski and Teeters spoke American Sign Language (ASL)
[Vol. 10:187
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appeal, Rewolinski claimed that the forcible removal of these
printouts and the sheriff's subsequent reading of them was an ille-
gal search and seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. He argued that the judge should not have admitted them
into evidence at his trial because of this violation.9 Rewolinski
claims that the judge's decision to admit the printouts was harmful
error because it effectively negated his heat of passion defense,
prompting the jury to convict him of first degree murder instead
of manslaughter.10
This Comment contends that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
used a flawed analysis which represents a dangerous trend away
from a previously broad accommodation to Fourth Amendment
protection. The doubt that this case brings to the rights of the deaf
in the privacy of their TDD calls underscores the tragedy of this
holding. Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of Fourth
Amendment analysis. Part II details the holdings and rationale of
the lower courts and the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Part III criti-
cizes both the supreme court's treatment of the burden of proof is-
sue and its mode of analysis which overemphasizes the significance
of property interests. This section will explain how these aspects
of the court's decision represent a departure from precedent. Part
IV examines public policy considerations, recent legislation in the
area of the rights of the deaf, and the problems inherent with the
admission of TDD printouts into evidence. This Comment con-
rather than English. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. It is interest.
ing to note that both the court of appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court added
the article "a" to the phrase, "die in [a] car accident. See Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at
404; Rewolinski, No. 88-2312-CR, 1989 WL, (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). Native speakers of.
ASL do not use any articles in their conversations. See TOM HuMPHRIES, CAROL
PADDEN & TERRENCE O'RouRKE, A BASIC COURSE IN AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE 15
(1980) [hereinafter HUMPHRIES]. The addition of this article by the courts seems to
prove that they do not understand the nature of ASL.
9. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vi-
olated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Rewolinski claimed that in his case there was both
a search and a seizure. The alleged seizure occurred first, when the dispatcher for-
cibly took the printouts from Rewolinski's hand. The alleged search occurred later
when the dispatcher, without a warrant, read the printout after the crime had oc-
curred. See Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 419 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
Rewolinski also claimed that the actions of the government violated his rights
under the Wisconsin Constitution. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly
pointed out, the standard is the same for interpreting both the United States and
the Wisconsin constitutional provisions. Id. at 405, n.5.
10. ML at 403, 411.
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cludes that the result in Rewolinski, that deaf people in Wisconsin
can no longer be secure in the privacy of their TDD calls, is a de-
parture from established Fourth Amendment precedent.
Part L" The Fourth Amendment
The United States Supreme Court considered the Fourth
Amendment's search and seizure provision in 1928 in Olmstead v.
United States." In Olmstead, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) placed wiretaps on the defendants' home and office tele-
phones from outside the premises. The Court held that there was
no search or seizure because the FBI agents had not entered the
premises. This holding provided that for a search or seizure to oc-
cur, the government must trespass on some tangible property or
invade upon some tangible property interest.' 2 Justice Brandeis
dissented, claiming that interference with privacy could constitute
a violation whether or not a trespass had occurred and further-
more that words could be "seized."' 3
The Supreme Court cited Olmstead in 1942 in Goldman v.
United States.14 In Goldman, the Court held that no search or
seizure occurred when the government overheard a conversation
in an adjacent room by placing an electronic listening device
against the wall.15 The Court found "no logical or reasonable dis-
tinction" between these facts and the wiretapping in Olmstead be-
cause the government had not entered the premises in either
case.16
In 1961, the Supreme Court reexamined both of these hold-
ings in Silverman v. United States.17 In the Silverman case, the
court, without expressly overruling Olmstead and Goldman, held
that the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to the re-
cording of oral statements overheard without any "technical tres-
pass under. . .local property law."' 8 In this case, government
agents used a spike microphone which entered the premises one-
sixteenth of an inch. The agents, however, did not enter the prem-
ises. Since there was some, albeit slight, entrance into the prem-
ises by the microphone, the Court justified this holding without
11. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
12. d. at 464-66.
13. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
15. I&
16. Id. at 135.
17. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
18. Id at 511.
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overruling Olmstead and Goldman.19
In 1967, in Katz v. United States,20 the Supreme Court again
looked at its Fourth Amendment holdings. The Court held that
Silverman had eroded the previous decisions to the point where
trespass was no longer the valid test for a search or seizure in-
quiry. Thus, the Katz Court expressly overruled the Olmstead and
Goldman holdings.21 The Court stated "[t]he premise that prop-
erty interests control the right of the government to search and
seize has been discredited."22 In Katz, the FBI had taped micro-
phones on top of a public telephone booth and recorded several
long distance calls that Katz had made to place gambling bets. The
trial court admitted these recordings into evidence against Katz at
his trial and the jury convicted Katz for interstate gambling. The
United States Supreme Court reversed Katz's conviction, holding
that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places" and fur-
ther, "what a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."2 3 The
Court believed that "[t]he Government's activities.. .violated the
privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the tele-
phone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the
Fourth Amendment."24 The Court, therefore, believed that by in-
vading Katz's privacy and recording his words, the government
had committed both a search and a seizure. 25
In Katz, the Court, although finding the government's con-
duct defensible, held that the judge should not have admitted the
recordings into evidence at trial because the FBI had not obtained
a warrant before taping Katz's call.26 The Court said "warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,"
subject only to very limited exceptions.27 The Court believed that
19. Id. at 511-12.
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21. Id. at 353.
22. Id. (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)) (brackets in
original).
23. 1I at 351-52.
24. Id. at 353.
25. Justice Black dissented in Katz, because he did not want the prior property
analysis to be disregarded. He felt that the Court should not rewrite the fourth
amendment "to bring it into harmony with the times." Id. at 364 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-57.
27. These exceptions are the "hot pursuit" exception and the "incident of
arrest" exception. Id at 357. Neither of these exceptions would apply in Rewolin-
ski's case because at the time of the alleged seizure, Rewolinski was not under
arrest. Furthermore, the crime had not yet been committed. At the time of the
alleged search, the deputy already was in possession of the printouts. As Justice
Bablitch correctly pointed out, the deputy could have obtained a warrant before
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the government could have taken steps to get a judicial warrant
without notifying the defendant ahead of time.28
In his Katz concurrence, Justice Harlan referred to what he
considered to be the two-fold requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment when determining whether an illegal search or seizure oc-
curred: "first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 29 The Supreme
Court adopted the wording of this concurrence in California v.
Ciraolo, and it has become the test for a search or seizure analy-
sis. 30 Each part of this two-part test must be proven by a "prepon-
derance of the credible evidence."3 1 Courts agree that the
defendant must prove an actual, subjective expectation of privacy
to meet the first part of the legitimate expectation of privacy
test.32 There is, however, debate over whether the defendant or
the government bears the burden of proof on the second part of
the legitimate expectation of privacy test, ie., whether defendant's
subjective expectation of privacy is objectively legitimate. 33 Once a
court establishes that a search or seizure occurred, the government
bears the burden to prove that it was justified in performing this
search or seizure.34
Two United States Supreme Court decisions appear at first
glance to settle the burden of proof debate. In Rakas v. Illinois,35
the state sought to admit into evidence weapons seized by police
from a car in which the defendant had been a passenger. The
Supreme Court stated "[t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has
the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights
were violated by the challenged Search or Seizure." 36 Further, in
Rawlings v. Kentucky,37 the government charged the defendant
with possession of drugs which were found in someone else's
reading the printouts to look for evidence. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 419 (Bablitch,
J., dissenting). The printouts were not going to leave the officer's presence so there
was no immediate urgency. Id Furthermore, the police did not need evidence to
arrest and hold Rewolinski. Rewolinski was not denying that he killed Teeters. In
fact, he reported the incident. Id. at 403.
28. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-58.
29. Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
31. See Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 407.
32. Id
33. Id at 406.
34. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 405.
35. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
36. Id at 131, n.1.
37. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
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purse. The Court stated that the defendant "bears the burden of
proving that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy" in the
item searched or seized. 38
Although these cases initially appear to place the burden on
the defendant to prove that an expectation of privacy is legitimate,
these cases actually involved a different issue: whether the defend-
ant had "standing" to sue as the victim of a search or seizure.39
There was no such problem in Rewolinski. The issue there was
whether a search occurred. This question is not reached by a court
unless it resolves the question of "standing" in favor of the defend-
ant.40 In other words, a court need not undertake a search or
seizure analysis if the defendant did not have standing to raise the
issue in the first place. The Supreme Court has not resolved the
question of who bears the burden on the objective legitimacy of
the expectation in a case where standing is not an issue.41
In 1989, the Supreme Court faced this issue in Florida v.
Riley.42 In Riley, the police saw marijuana growing in the defend-
ant's greenhouse, while hovering 400 feet over the defendant's
property in a helicopter. The issue in Riley was whether this con-
stituted a search subject to Fourth Amendment protection.43 The
Court held that although Riley may have had a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, it was not legitimate because the helicopter was
within legal distance and in a public airway.44 The Riley court di-
vided on who should bear the burden to prove the objective legiti-
macy or illegitimacy of the subjective privacy expectation. Four
justices said that the state should bear the burden given the facts
of the Riley case. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, wrote "none of
our prior decisions tell us who has the burden of proving whether
Riley's expectation of privacy was reasonable." 45 Justice Black-
mun "would impose upon the prosecution the burden of proving
contrary facts necessary to show that Riley lacked a reasonable ex-
pectation .... ,"46 Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens, claimed "the burden of proof properly rests
38. Id. at 104.
39. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762, n.8 (1979), the Court wrote the
"respondent concedes that the suitcase [which the government searched] was his
property.. .so he had standing to challenge the search." Thus, after Rakas, the
Court still saw standing as a separate issue based on property ownership.
40. See Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 406.
41. Id.
42. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
43. Id. at 447-48.
44. Id. at 450-52 (plurality opinion); id. at 452 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 468.
1992]
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with the state and not with the individual defendant." 47 Justice
White's plurality opinion did not address the burden of proof ques-
tion.48 Justice O'Connor, concurring only in the judgment, was the
only justice who clearly assigned this part of the burden to the de-
fendant. 49 She wrote "the defendant must bear the burden of
proving that his expectation of privacy was a reasonable one, and
thus that a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
even took place."50 She did not mention either the Rakas or the
Rawlings decisions as justification for this holding.51
In summary, Katz conclusively established that a court
should perform a search or seizure inquiry by first determining
whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the item which the government allegedly searched or seized. This
item need not be tangible; even words can be "searched" or
"seized." Under Katz, a search or seizure analysis ordinarily con-
sists of two parts: 1) whether the defendant had a "legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy" 52 in the item in question and 2) whether the
government's conduct was reasonable in searching for and seizing
the item. The first part determines whether a search or seizure
exists, and the second part establishes whether a given search or
seizure was reasonable.53 The Supreme Court has determined that
the defendant bears the burden of proof on the first part of this
two-part test, but has not yet clearly determined whether the de-
fendant or the government bears the burden of proof on the sec-
ond part. It is settled, however, that if a court determines through
this two-part test that the defendant did have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the item, then a search or seizure has occurred.
As a final step in the analysis, the government has the burden to
show that its conduct was reasonable, making the search or seizure
legal.
47. Id at 465-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. I& at 450.
49. Id at 455 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
50. Id
51. Id The Rewolinski court cites other decisions which agree with the view
that the defendant always bears the burden of proof on this issue. Rewolinski, 464
N.W.2d at 406. However, neither the Wisconsin courts nor the United States
Supreme Court had conclusively placed the burden on either party. Id
52. The courts sometimes use the words "reasonable" or "justifiable" rather
than "legitimate." As the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly pointed out, these
terms are interchangeable in the case law. Id at 405, n.6 (citing United States v.
McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1543, n.5 (11th Cir. 1987)). The author of this Comment
has chosen to use the term "legitimate" in order to avoid confusion, since the sec-
ond part of a search or seizure inquiry requires an examination of the "reasonable-
ness" of the government's conduct.
53. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Wisconsin v. Monahan, 251
N.W.2d 421 (1977).
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Part IL Wisconsin v. Rewolinski" Case Description
It was against this backdrop that the Wisconsin courts de-
cided Wisconsin v. Rewolinski.54 The case provided the unique
opportunity to decide the question of whether a search and seizure
occurred when the sheriff forcibly took, and later read, two TDD
printouts containing the words from phone conversations between
two deaf people.
Before trial, Rewolinski filed three pre-trial motions to sup-
press the TDD transcripts.55 The trial judge deferred ruling on
these pre-trial motions deciding instead to rule on them when the
state called its first witness to testify about the TDD printouts.
5 6
Consequently, Rewolinski was not granted a pre-trial suppression
hearing.5 7 When the state called its first witness, the trial judge
54. Wisconsin v. Rewolinski, No. 88-2312-CR, 1989 WL (Wis. Ct. App (1989),
aff'd 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990), cert denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1694 (1991).
55. The first two suppression motions, filed several months before trial, asked
the judge to suppress this evidence but added that a hearing would be requested at
a later date if defense counsel found it necessary. The third motion was filed one
day before trial; this time a hearing was requested. Id. at 413.
56. This witness was Deputy Sheriff Sandra Roed, the officer who had taken
the TDD printouts from Rewolinski's hand on June 9, 1987. Id. at 404.
57. Since the state had no witnesses available the day before trial, the judge re-
fused to hold a hearing at that time. WIsc. STAT § 971.31 (1986) requires in relevant
part:
(1) Any motion which is capable of determination without the
trial of the general issue may be made before trial.
(2) Except as provided in sub. (5), defenses and objections based
on . . . the use of illegal means to secure evidence shall be raised
before trial by motion or be deemed waived. The court may, however,
entertain such motion at the trial, in which case the defendant waives
any jeopardy that may have attached. The motion to suppress evi-
dence shall be so entertained with waiver of jeopardy when it appears
that the defendant is surprised by the state's possession of such evi-
dence.
(3) The admissibility of any statement of the defendant shall be
determined at the trial by the court in an evidentiary hearing out of
the presence of the jury, unless the defendant, by motion, challenges
the admissibility of such statement before trial.
(4) Except as provided in sub. (3), a motion shall be determined
before trial of the general issue unless the court orders that it be de-
ferred for determination at the trial. All issues of fact arising out of
such motion shall be tried by the court without a jury.
(5)(a) Motions before trial shall be served and filed within 10 days
after the initial appearance of the defendant in a misdemeanor action
or 10 days after arraignment in a felony action unless the court other-
wise permits.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Rewolinski had waived his right to an evi-
dentiary hearing under this statute. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 403. The court ad-
mitted however, that "[t]he procedure used below was not perfect." Id at 413. The
court refused to remand for an evidentiary hearing because they believed that
Rewolinski should not be given a remand for "the opportunity to do what [he]
should have done before, that is, to show a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id.
This argument begs the question. Rewolinski claimed specifically that he should
Law and Inequality
decided to admit the printouts into evidence.58
The trial judge, in a statement for the record, said that
Rewolinski had no legitimate expectation of privacy in these calls
because Rewolinski did not push the privacy button which would
have prevented the TDD machine from making a printout of the
calls. 59 Since the judge found that the printouts were neither
searched nor seized, he did not need to take the next step and de-
cide whether, under the facts of the case, such a search or seizure
would have been reasonable. The judge also found it significant
that it was not only Rewolinski's call but also Teeters'. 6 In addi-
tion, the judge thought that the printouts belonged to the sheriff's
department.6 1 The judge did not find the defendant's analogy to
Katz persuasive because he did not consider this a case of govern-
ment eavesdropping. 62 Since the judge found that no search or
seizure had occurred, he did not take the next step of determining
whether such a search would have been reasonable.6 3
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals for the Third District, in an
unpublished decision, affirmed the trial court.64 Judge Thomas
Cane concurred in the judgment only and wrote separately.65 The
majority opinion placed the burden on the defendant to prove that
he had a subjective expectation of privacy and that it was objec-
tively legitimate.66 The court also held that because Rewolinski
did not push the privacy button on the TDD, he "failed to rebut
the permissible inference that confidentiality was not anticipated
when the calls took place."6 7 The opinion did not define the term
"permissible inference" nor did it explain for future cases which
have been given an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a search and seizure
occurred. He was not given such an opportunity. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's
argument states that Rewolinski should have proven his legitimate expectation of
privacy before the time of his appeal. The question at issue is at what time before
appeal this legitimate expectation should have been proven. Rewolinski argued
that it should have been at a suppression hearing before trial. In other words,
Rewolinski also thought he should have proven this element prior to appeal. Since
he was not given a suppression hearing, however, he was not given this opportunity.
For this reason, on appeal, Rewolinski requested a remand for a hearing. A re-
mand for a hearing would not be inconsistent with the court's argument. A remand
for a suppression hearing is permitted by the holding in Upchurch v. Wisconsin,
219 N.W.2d 363 (1974).





63. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
64. Wisconsin v. Rewolinski, No. 88-2312-CR, 1989 WL (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
65. Id.




inferences it would permit to override a defendant's evidence re-
garding a subjective expectation of privacy.
The majority opinion also stated that Rewolinski's attempt to
take the printouts provided some evidence of his subjective expec-
tation. Moreover, the opinion acknowledged that it was reasonable
to believe that Rewolinski may not have known about the privacy
button. However, Rewolinski failed to carry his burden on the
subjective part of the test because he did not take the stand or
otherwise show why he did not invoke the privacy option.6 s It ap-
pears that the majority did not find it necessary to explore the ob-
jective legitimacy of his expectation of privacy since it did not find
that Rewolinski had a subjective expectation.
Judge Cane disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
Rewolinski did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy.6 9 He,
like the majority, placed the burden on the defendant to prove
both the subjective expectation of privacy and that the expectation
was objectively legitimate. He believed however, that Rewolinski
had met these burdens. 70 Judge Cane did not believe that failure
to push the privacy button was significant. In his view, Rewolinski
had proven his expectation conclusively when he tore off the
printouts and refused to release them until forced to do so.7 1
Judge Cane also believed that this expectation was legitimate,
since Rewolinski was in a private area of the department where
the deputies were not able to see his calls. 72 Although Judge Cane
found the decision to admit the TDD printouts to be error, he
thought it harmless error because the rest of the evidence allowed
no reasonable possibility that the printouts contributed to the
conviction. 73
Fourth Amendment precedent dictates that whether a de-
fendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy depends on the to-
tality of the circumstances. 74 Under this standard, a court should
balance the defendant's privacy interest in the item with society's
interest in the government's conduct.75 The majority did not ex-
plicitly state that this was the standard they used. However, its







74. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 97 (1980).




amined Rewolinski's behavior to determine whether it demon-
strated a privacy interest. Also in accordance with precedent, the
court of appeals declined to weigh the property interests involved.
In a four to three decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court af-
firmed the court of appeals' decision.76 The supreme court agreed
with the court of appeals that the defendant bears the burden to
prove both that he had a subjective expectation and that it was ob-
jectively legitimate.77 The majority of the court put dominant em-
phasis on the objective element of the test and made no conclusive
finding on Rewolinski's subjective expectation.78 Because the
court did not conclusively state whether Rewolinski had any sub-
jective expectation of privacy, 79 it only had to decide whether
Rewolinski's expectation of privacy was objectively legitimate to
determine whether a search or seizure had occurred. Thus, the
majority opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court skipped the sub-
jective prong of the test and only examined whether such an ex-
pectation was objectively legitimate.
The majority believed that Rewolinski's subjective expecta-
tion in the privacy of his TDD call was not an expectation that so-
ciety would deem legitimate.8 0 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
majority, unlike the court of appeals, specifically stated that the
expectation must be legitimate based on the totality of the circum-
stances.8 ' The majority opinion stated that six factors were rele-
vant to defining the totality of the circumstances:
(1) Whether the defendant had a property interest in the
premises; (2) whether he was legitimately (lawfully) on the
premises; (3) whether he had complete dominion and control
and the right to exclude others; (4) whether he took precau-
tions customarily taken by those seeking privacy; (5) whether
he put the property to some private use; (6) whether the claim
of privacy is consistent with historical notions of privacy.8 2
The Wisconsin Supreme Court took these six factors from its 1981
decision in Wisconsin v. Fillyaw. 83 The Fillyaw court claimed
these factors resulted from the United States Supreme Court's de-
76. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 403.
77. I& at 405-06.
78. Id. at 407.
79. The opinion stated that, "he arguably did not" have such an expectation but
did not give any reasons. The opinion therefore focused only on whether such an
expectation, if Rewolinski had it, would be legitimate. Id. Two of the dissenting
Justices believed that Rewolinski had proven a subjective expectation of privacy.
Id. at 416 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
80. I&
81. Id.
82. Id. at 407.
83. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Filyaw, 312 N.W.2d 795 (1981)).
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cision in Rakas.84 The Rewolinski majority found that analysis of
these factors showed that Rewolinski did not have a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy.8 5
For factor one, the Wisconsin Supreme Court majority found
it significant that Rewolinski did not own the TDD machine, the
ink or the paper.8 6 In concluding that Rewolinski did not have a
property interest in the premises, the court also pointed to the
strong police interest and the "public presence" which "pervaded"
the area.8 7 For factor two, although admitting that Rewolinski
was legitimately on the premises, the majority found it significant
that Rewolinski's initial purpose for being at the station was an
arrest for a traffic offense.88 Addressing factor three, the majority
pointed out that Rewolinski clearly had no control over the TDD
machine itself or the dispatch area and had no right to exclude
others.8 9 The majority found that Rewolinski did not meet factor
four because he knowingly exposed his call to the deputy who
might have been able to read the TDD, as well as to another per-
son, "Bob," who Rewolinski knew was at Teeters' house during
the call.90 The majority also pointed out that Rewolinski could
have limited the length of the call, thereby assuring that the words
were never written.91 The court speculated that he could have
walked home, used public transportation or had the police place
the call for him.92 The majority believed that Rewolinski did not
meet factor five because the dispatcher had given Rewolinski per-
mission to use the TDD to find a ride. Thus, the dispatcher was
aware of Rewolinski's purpose and knew that the call was ongoing,
leading the majority to find that Rewolinski had not put the prop-
erty to private use.93 Finally, the majority held that Rewolinski
did not meet factor six because "[t]he dispatch area of a police sta-
tion, by definition and necessity, is an area pervaded by govern-
ment intrusion; [t]elephone calls placed to and from police
dispatch areas are routinely monitored and recorded." 94 In addi-
tion, the majority noted that Teeters was a co-conversationalist.
The majority claimed that Rewolinski could not expect privacy in
84. Fillyaw, 312 N.W.2d at 801, n.6.
85. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 407.
86. I&
87. Id
88. Id, at 408.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id at 409.
92. Id
93. Id.
94. Id It should be noted that this fact was assumed by the court. It was not a
fact in the record. Id, at 415 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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Teeters' words, which were also on the TDD printouts.95 The ma-
jority thus concluded that the taking of the TDD printouts and the
subsequent reading of them was not a search and seizure protected
by the Fourth Amendment.96
The majority, therefore, did not continue its search or seizure
analysis. The majority added, however, that even if the Fourth
Amendment protected the printouts, the government's conduct in
taking them was reasonable and therefore did not represent an il-
legal search and seizure.97 Finally, the majority wrote that even if
the government had obtained the TDD printouts by an illegal
search and seizure, the decision to admit them into evidence was
harmless error.98 The majority refused to remand for an eviden-
tiary hearing, stating that Rewolinski had waived his statutory
right to a suppression hearing. 99
Justice Shirley Abrahamson dissented. She argued that a
proper analysis under the totality of the circumstances required a
balancing of society's interest in the government's conduct with
the defendant's privacy interest.'i ° She did not believe the record
was complete enough to perform such a test and wanted to remand
95. Id at 409 (majority opinion).
96. Id at 410.
97. Id The majority stated that one factor to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the government's conduct is whether or not the government's
purpose in the alleged searching or seizing was to look for evidence of a crime. Id
The majority stated that since the officer did not know at the time of the taking of
the printouts that a crime would occur, the government's conduct must be seen as
reasonable. Id This argument could also be used to say that the government's con-
duct was irrational. If the police had no reason to suspect that the printouts were
evidence of a crime, then it is hard to justify the taking of these printouts which
represented a call made between Rewolinski and his girlfriend. It is difficult to im-
agine the police's need to read or hear every call which is made from the police
station by a citizen to a boyfriend or girlfriend. Furthermore, the actual reading of
the printouts occurred after the police had knowledge of the crime. At that time,
the police were looking for evidence. By the court's own logic, therefore, the al-
leged search would be unreasonable and thus illegal.
The court also believed that the officer's conduct was reasonable because the
officer may have needed the printouts for logging purposes. Id This "fact" was
pure speculation by the court. Finally, the court correctly pointed out that the
TDD machine had been malfunctioning by printing some words or phrases two
times or by pulling up words from other calls. Id at 411. As will be discussed later,
this fact seems to indicate that the printouts themselves may be inaccurate as evi-
dence. See infra notes 196-198 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 412-13. The majority believed that the error was harmless because
they thought there was enough other evidence showing that there was not suffi-
cient provocation for a finding of manslaughter. This other evidence included the
nature of Teeter's death, which was caused by strangulation with a belt, followed
by submergence in water. The court believed that this would have taken too much
time to be manslaughter. Idc at 413.
99. Id at 413. See also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
100. Id at 414 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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for an evidentiary hearing.101
Justices William Bablitch joined by Justice Nathan Heffer-
nan dissented, stating that the majority erred because it did not
"take into account the very different world that is the world with-
out sound."' 0 2 Justice Bablitch argued that because TDD's are not
widely available and because Rewolinski had no alternative means
of communication, his expectation of privacy in these calls must be
seen as legitimate.'0 3 They, like Justice Abrahamson, believed
that the proper mode of analysis was a balancing test.1° 4 They ar-
gued that Katz changed the search and seizure test so that prop-
erty and trespass are no longer determining factors and that
consequently, words are protected by the Fourth Amendment. 0 5
In addition, they claimed that the Fillyaw factors are not applica-
ble to the Rewolinski case because Fillyaw questioned whether
there was standing, not whether a search occurred. 0 6 Further-
more, they found the Fillyaw factors to be inapplicable because, as
in Katz, the issue in the Rewolinski case had nothing to do with
privacy of space' 07 but rather a privacy interest in words.
Part III: Analysis
This analysis will examine the court's holding in the Rewolin-
ski case. This Comment concludes that this holding represents
flawed reasoning which is inconsistent with precedent.
1. Rewolinski had a subjective expectation of privacy.
Some commentators, including Justice Harlan, author of the
two-part test, argue that the courts should remove the subjective
prong from the test. These commentators contend the inclusion of
this prong could conceivably allow the government to announce
that all people will be under surveillance from this time forward,
thus precluding any challenges to government action under the
Fourth Amendment.o 8 Justice Harlan, eventually came to this
same conclusion in his United States v. White109 dissent. 110
101. Id.
102. Id. at 416 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 416-17.
104. Id. at 418.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 420.
107. Id.
108. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.1(c) (1978) (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 354 (1979)).
109. United States v. White, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
110. 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Although the United States Supreme Court still generally requires
proof of this prong, in Smith v. Maryland,"' the majority con-
ceded that the subjective test may not always yield adequate pro-
tection. For example, the Smith court indicated that the
subjective prong would be inapplicable if the government categori-
cally announced that all people would be under surveillance at all
times.112 The Smith court further stated that in those cases
where a subjective expectation inquiry is not appropriate "[iln de-
termining whether a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' existed...a
normative inquiry would be proper."113 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court majority did not, however, make any conclusion on the issue
of whether Rewolinski had a subjective expectation of privacy. 14
In the Rewolinski case, there can be no genuine dispute
about whether Rewolinski had a subjective expectation of privacy.
he court of appeals majority was the only opinion which conclu-
sively stated that Rewolinski did not have a subjective expectation
of privacy. 115 The court of appeals admitted, however, that by try-
ing to take the printouts with him, Rewolinski had demonstrated
some desire for confidentiality.116 There is agreement among the
various Rewolinski opinions that the defendant bears the burden
of proof on the question of whether the defendant had a subjective
expectation of privacy.117 Because the question of what was in the
defendant's mind is a question only the defendant can answer, it
seems logical to make the defendant prove such an expectation.
The problem in this area, however, is that the court of appeals did
not apply the appropriate standard for meeting that burden.
Three standards are available for burden of proof analysis:
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.118 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court correctly stated that the standard for the legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy test is a preponderance of the credible evidence."19
The court's majority did not decide the issue of whether Rewolin-
ski actually had a subjective expectation of privacy and it is not
clear, therefore, what the result would be if they had done so.12 0
111. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
112. Id. at 740 n.5.
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 66, 77 and accompanying text.
118. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE,
§ 2916 (1987) [hereinafter INWINKELRIED].
119. See Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 407-08.
120. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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The court of appeals majority, which did rule on this issue, did not
specify which standard of proof it had chosen. However, it allowed
Rewolinski's failure to rebut a permissible inference to undermine
the evidence of an expectation of confidentiality which it admitted
Rewolinski had shown.121 If a court allows a permissible inference
to override the defendant's proof, the standard used by the court
of appeals left unclear the amount of proof required of a defendant
to overcome the presumption. The amount of proof mandated by
the court of appeals, therefore, may not be the required "more
likely than not" (i.e. preponderance of the evidence) standard.122
Without further definition of which permissible inferences can
override the defendant's offered proof, the court of appeals' deci-
sion provides no guidance to future courts faced with this issue.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court majority also performed a
flawed analysis. It suggested that Rewolinski may not have had a
subjective expectation of privacy because all calls to and from the
police station are "routinely monitored and recorded."'12 3 This was
not a "fact" in the record nor is there any evidence that Rewolin-
ski was aware of any such practice. The majority's statement, if
true, means that all citizens are now on notice that there can be no
private calls, under any circumstances, from a police station be-
cause all calls are routinely monitored and recorded. However, the
majority's conclusion was incorrect. As each court stated,
Rewolinski could have pushed the privacy button if he had wanted
to avoid making a printout of his calls. 124 Thus, it is clear that the
police will not monitor some calls. Specifically, the police will not
monitor those calls where the TDD caller invokes the privacy op-
tion. The record indicates that prior to reading the printouts, the
deputy was unaware of the contents of Rewolinski's calls. 125 It is
not clear from the record that calls were otherwise being moni-
tored. Rather it seems that the court merely assumed that they
were.
All the courts agreed that Rewolinski had proven some evi-
dence of a subjective expectation of privacy. Since such an expec-
tation of privacy is in the defendant's mind, it can never be known
for sure whether the defendant actually had such an expectation.
However, it need only appear more likely than not that defendant
had a subjective expectation of privacy.126 Rewolinski, by attempt-
121. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
122. INWINKELRIED, supra note 153, at § 2916.
123. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 59, 67 and accompanying text.
125. See Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 404, 410.
126. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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ing to take the printouts and by not giving them up until forced to
do so, proved that it was more likely than not that he had an ac-
tual, subjective expectation of privacy.
2. Rewolinski had a legitimate objective expectation of
privacy.
The key issue in this case centered around Rewolinski's legit-
imate objective expectation of privacy. Neither the United States
Supreme Court nor the Wisconsin courts had assigned the burden
of proof for this issue to either party.12 7 The parties asked the
Rewolinski courts to decide both who bears the burden of proof on
this issue and whether that party had met its burden.
A. The defendant should not always bear the burden on
the legitimacy issue.
In Rewolinski, the burden of proof on this issue became cru-
cial because the lack of a suppression hearing made the record
very sparse.128 In Florida v. Riley, at least four Supreme Court
justices believed that in some cases the burden should be on the
government to prove that an expectation of privacy is illegiti-
mate.129 The cases cited by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in sup-
port of its holding that the defendant carries the burden, are, as
previously noted, considered to be "standing" cases.130 The ques-
tion of whether a person has standing to challenge a search or
seizure may, in fact, depend on the kind of property interest the
person has in the item searched or seized.131 This makes standing
a much simpler question. However, once a court decides that if
anyone was a victim of a search or seizure, it was the defendant,
the question becomes more difficult. In essence, the question then
becomes whether society will recognize the privacy interest in that
item. A court must determine this by balancing the defendant's
privacy interest in the item with society's interest in the govern-
ment's conduct based on the totality of the circumstances. 132 This
is a broad standard which requires full fact finding. Some of the
information may be within the exclusive knowledge of the
government.
Much is unknown about the facts of the Rewolinski case.
127. See supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
128. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 415 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
129. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.




The courts speculated about the motives of the deputy in taking
the printouts (e.g., stating that the police department may have
needed them for logging or that the department may routinely rec-
ord all calls).133 However, since all three state courts continually
asserted that Rewolinski could have pushed the "privacy button"
had he desired to protect his privacy interests, the existence of
these motives is unlikely. 3 4 As Justice Abrahamson noted in
dissent:
the record does not furnish adequate information about the op-
eration of the TDD, the department's practice of monitoring
incoming and outgoing conversations (of the hearing and the
hearing impaired) on telephones located in the department or
in the dispatch areas, and the needs of law enforcement to
monitor telephone calls of both the hearing and hearing im-
paired who happen to be in the department but who are not
under arrest.135
Much of the information to which Justice Abrahamson refers is in
the exclusive control of the government. To place the burden on
the defendant to rebut all possible government motives is patently
unfair. According to the court of appeals, a defendant must also
prove the legitimacy of her expectation to overcome a "permissible
inference." It is not clear that this is the required preponderance
of the evidence standard.'3 6 Placing the burden on the party hav-
ing better access to the facts, as the four justices in Riley sug-
gested,13 7 is one possible approach to this problem. This would
also be consistent with the holding in Smith, which suggested that
sometimes a normative approach is appropriate to determine
whether a defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy. 3 8
B. The defendant met the burden on the legitimacy issue.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court majority incorrectly used the
Fillyaw factors 3 9 to answer this question. The majority should
not have used these factors because, as stated previously, they ap-
ply only to "standing" cases.' 40 Without acknowledging the full
power of this extension, the Wisconsin Supreme Court majority
broadened the use of these factors to include cases where standing
was not at issue. The Fillyaw factors emphasize property control.
133. See Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 410-11.
134. See supra notes 59, 67 and accompanying text.
135. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 415 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
136. See supra notes 67, 122 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
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In Katz, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that an
analysis of trespass and property ownership is not the proper way
to decide search and seizure questions.141 There may be reasons to
require ownership and control to be factors in determining
whether a person has a right to claim that the government vio-
lated her Fourth Amendment rights. Katz, however, has conclu-
sively held that whether a search or seizure has occurred depends
upon notions of privacy interests.142 Privacy will not always de-
pend on property control.143 Since Katz, it has become clear that
words can be searched or seized.144 That fact alone means that
trespass can no longer be the dominant mode of analysis. The
Katz type of analysis provides more expansive Fourth Amendment
protection. The Wisconsin Supreme Court majority in its Rewolin-
ski decision has limited that protection.
C. Even if the Wisconsin Supreme Court majority had
been correct in its use of the Fillyaw factors,
the court did not properly analyze these
factors.
a. Whether the defendant had a property interest in the
premises
The majority of the court found it significant that Rewolinski
did not own the TDD machine, the paper or the ink.145 Since the
court did not state that it was disregarding Katz and its progeny, it
must have admitted that search and seizure of words themselves is
possible. Indeed, it is the admission into evidence of his seized
words which Rewolinski challenged.4 6 It is hard to believe that
the court intended to hold that the original owner of a piece of pa-
per and a writing utensil owns any words subsequently written on
the paper. Furthermore, by permitting Rewolinski to use the
TDD, knowing that its use would require ink and paper, the police
had given him permission to control and own the ink and paper
used.
The majority of the court characterized the police station as
"public."'147 Rewolinski, however, was in a limited access area not
open to the public.148 Moreover, Katz had held that a person can
141. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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have a legitimate expectation of privacy even in a public place.' 4 9
b. Whether he was legitimately (lawfully) on the premises
The majority found it significant that Rewolinski initially en-
tered the police station because of an arrest.i 5° Yet the court could
not deny that he was lawfully on the premises at the time of the
calls.15 1 After he was released, the police gave Rewolinski permis-
sion to use their TDD machine; 52 Rewolinski was free to leave
the police station at any time.'5 3 He went into the limited access
area to use the TDD machine to call for a ride home because the
police had given him permission to do so.' 54 He was certainly law-
fully using the TDD machine. At the time of the calls, Rewolinski
was like any other civilian walking in off the street. The natural
extension of the Rewolinski holding is that any citizen who uses a
police telephone, for any purpose, can have the contents of that
call admitted into evidence at a later trial.
c. Whether he had complete dominion and control and
the right to exclude others
The majority of the court correctly concluded that Rewolin-
ski could not exclude the deputy from the limited access area nor
did he have dominion and control over that area.1 55 Yet, he had
control over the TDD machine at the time of the calls. He could
have covered the screen and the paper thereby excluding others
from his calls. Furthermore, the courts and the state consistently
argued that Rewolinski could have pushed the privacy button to
avoid making printouts of the calls.i 56 This fact alone gave
Rewolinski control.
d. Whether he took precautions customarily taken by
those seeking privacy
The majority stated that Rewolinski knowingly exposed his
calls to the deputy who might have been able to read the visual
display on the TDD machine. i 57 The validity of this assertion de-
149. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
151. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 408.
152. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
153. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 408.
154. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
155. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 408.
156. See supra notes 59, 67 and accompanying text, and Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d
at 404.
157. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. This argument, at first glance,
appears to be like other cases where the Court found no legitimate expectation of
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pends upon the answer to the first question of whether Rewolinski
actually had a subjective expectation of privacy. If he did, then by
definition, he did not knowingly expose the calls. It is also signifi-
cant that the deputy did not know anything Rewolinski and Teet-
ers said until after the printouts were taken.158
The majority also stated that its decision was influenced by
Rewolinski's knowledge that "Bob" was at the house when Teeters
and Rewolinski were communicating. 159 This does not appear rel-
evant to whether Rewolinski had a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy as to the police's knowledge of the contents of his calls.
Whenever there is a two-way phone conversation, the people in-
volved know that their words are not private from at least one
other person. This fact, in itself, does not give the police a right to
search and seize a call. If it did, all calls could be taken and admit-
ted into evidence. Under this rationale, Katz's call would have
been properly admitted into evidence. Thus, this holding in the
Rewolinski case cannot be justified on this basis without overrul-
ing Katz. Furthermore, this was not a case where Bob or Teeters
was coming forward to testify. There is no evidence that Bob saw
any of the conversation. Thus, Bob's presence was not relevant to
the legitimacy of Rewolinski's expectation of privacy.
The majority also noted that Rewolinski could have kept his
calls brief and to the point, taken alternate transportation or had
the police place the calls for him.16 0 Unfortunately, this statement
gives Rewolinski, as a deaf person requiring a TDD to communi-
cate, very limited options. As Justice Bablitch points out in his
dissent:
privacy because members of the public could have seen the area or the item
searched. For example, in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451, see supra notes 42-51
and accompanying text, the Court said "Any member of the public could legally
have been flying over the Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet
and could have observed Riley's greenhouse. The police officer did no more." The
Riley case involved a wide open field which is distinguishable from a piece of paper
and the visual display on the TDD machine, both of which Rewolinski could have
covered using his own body in order to hide it from view. Similarly, in Wabun-
Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1990) the court held that Wabun-In-
ini had no legitimate expectation of privacy in film left at a one hour film develop-
ing store because each print was exposed to the public for ten to fifteen seconds
during the drying process. In the Wabun-Inini case, Wabun-Inini was not even
present during the developing process. Thus, he clearly could not prevent the
prints from being viewed by the general public. Rewolinski, on the other hand, was
in the room during the TDD calls and could easily have prevented the deputy, who
was the only other person present, from viewing the printouts and the TDD
display.
158. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 415 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 408.
160. Id. at 408-09.
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the majority advises deaf citizens that if they wish to rely on a
technology that will enable them to lead more independent
and productive lives in a hearing dominated world, they must
subject themselves to the choices of either opening up their
conversation for public examination, limiting their conversa-
tion to purposes this court finds appropriate, returning to their
former dependence on others to make their phone calls for
them, or bypassing the technology's advantages altogether.161
These printouts were only available to the government because
Rewolinski is deaf and needs the use of a TDD to communicate by
telephone. Due to the Katz holding, hearing people can walk
down the street to a pay phone to be secure in their privacy. The
Rewolinski holding means that deaf people cannot be secure in the
privacy of their TDD calls. There is no justification for this kind
of discrimination. Furthermore, as will be seen,162 it is inconsis-
tent with recent legislation in the area of the rights of the deaf.
e. Whether he put the property to some private use
The majority argued that Deputy Roed gave Rewolinski per-
mission to use the TDD machine and thus, knew about both the
purpose of the calls and that they were ongoing.163 In fact, the
deputy had no idea what Rewolinski and Teeters said during the
calls until later when she read the printouts.164 Furthermore, the
deputy knew only what Rewolinski had asserted as his purpose for
the calls. Once the calls began, the conversation turned to other
topics. Thus, the purpose of the call changed. By the court's own
logic, Rewolinski had put the property to private use.
In addition, under Katz, even if the government knew that
the calls were ongoing and also knew the purpose of the calls, such
knowledge does not strip a defendant of her legitimate expectation
of privacy. 6 5 In Katz, the government tapped the pay phone spe-
cifically because they knew that Katz had been placing bets from
that phone. 166 The government thus had knowledge of the pur-
pose and ongoing nature of the calls. Rewolinski, therefore, is in-
consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Katz.
f. Whether the claim of privacy is consistent with
historical notions of privacy
The majority argued that phone calls placed to and from the
161. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 417 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
162. See infra notes 201-208 and accompanying text.
163. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 409.
164. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
165. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-57.
166. Id. at 354.
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police station are routinely monitored and recorded by police.167
This was not a fact in evidence; the court made this assumption
sua sponte.168 Moreover, it was contradictory for the court to find
that the state "needed" these TDD printouts and then to repeat-
edly claim that Rewolinski could have pushed the privacy button
and avoided making the printouts altogether.169 Finally, the court
held that Teeters was also a party to the calls and Rewolinski
could not expect privacy in her words.170 The problem here is that
a court could apply this same argument to any two-way call. This
logic would mean that the government could search and seize any
call, including the call at issue in Katz,1 71 and enter it into evi-
dence. Therefore, this argument also is inconsistent with Katz.
The logic of this argument further suggests that, once seized,
the government could use the call against either party to the call.
Thus, the majority's argument indicates that if the situation were
reversed and Rewolinski had said something incriminating against
Teeters, the government could use the statement later in a trial
against her. It may be that after the Rewolinski holding, no per-
son has a legitimate expectation of privacy in their telephone calls.
If this is the case, then Katz is no longer the law in Wisconsin,
making Wisconsin's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment a vi-
olation of the United States Constitution as interpreted by the
Supreme Court.
3. The government's conduct was unreasonable.
As Justice Abrahamson wrote, a suppression hearing would
have helped determine the reasonableness of the government's
conduct. 172 However, the court would only reach the reasonable-
ness question if it had already decided that a search or seizure had
occurred.173 In Rewolinski, the supreme court ruled that no
search or seizure had taken place. However, the majority went on
to state that even if Rewolinski did have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the TDD printouts, the search undertaken by the
government was nevertheless reasonable.
When determining whether the government acted reason-
ably, Katz requires the burden be placed on the government to
167. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 409.
168. Id. at 415 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
169. See supra notes 17, 59, 67 and accompanying text, and Rewolinski, 464
N.W.2d at 404.
170. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 409.
171. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
172. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 414 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
173. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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show the reasonableness of its conduct. The majority of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court allowed all speculation, in the form of a
"permissible inference," to benefit the state rather than the de-
fendant.174 Essentially, by allowing this "permissible inference" to
operate in favor of the government, the court placed the burden of
proving whether the search was reasonable on the defendant. This
placement of the burden directly conflicts with the Court's holding
in Katz.
The government's conduct was reasonable, according to the
majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, because the deputy did
not know of the existence of a crime when she allegedly seized the
printouts. 75 This argument can cut either way.' 76 The deputy's
conduct in forcibly taking two printed transcripts of calls between
two people, the contents of which she knew nothing about, could
also be seen as irrational, and thus unreasonable. The court as-
serted that the deputy "reasonably" thought that calls other than
Rewolinski's and Teeters' were on the printouts, due to the mal-
function of the TDD machine. 177 This belief proves too much; it
arguably provides proof that TDD printouts are not reliable as evi-
dence. In addition, even if the alleged seizure occurred before the
crime, the alleged search (reading the transcripts) occurred after
the police knew of the crime and were looking for evidence.
178
The police would have had time to get a warrant before reading
the printouts.179 Failure to do so violated the principle that "war-
rantless searches are per se unreasonable." 8 0
If the Rewolinski court had held that there was a search and
seizure but that the government's conduct was reasonable, making
it a legal search and seizure, the holding would have been less
damaging than the actual holding that the government's actions
did not even constitute a search or seizure. Such a holding would
have required future courts to perform a case by case analysis of
whether the government's conduct was reasonable given a particu-
lar context. The Rewolinski holding, on the other hand, ignores
the impact of the government's conduct in any search and seizure
analysis. Furthermore, since the government bears the burden on
the reasonableness of test, a holding that there was a search and
seizure would incorporate a presumption of privacy in the
174. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
175. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 410-11.
176. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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printouts. At least if it had performed such an analysis the court
would be affirming deaf persons' rights to privacy in their TDD
calls.
4. The decision to admit the TDD printouts was not
harmless error.
Judge Cane of the court of appeals stated that even if the
government's conduct was unreasonable, the admission of the
printout was harmless error. Even though the supreme court in
Rewolinski was not required to rule on this question, it did address
the issue. I8 l Under Wisconsin v. Dyess,182 evidence improperly
admitted is harmless error if there is "no reasonable probability
that it contributed to the conviction." With all the "mights" and
"coulds" that the Wisconsin Supreme Court employed against
Rewolinski, it is hard to believe that it did not find any reasonable
probability that the admission of these TDD printouts contributed
to Rewolinski's conviction. The state pointed out the importance
of the TDD printouts during closing arguments.I8 3  These
printouts contained Teeters' expression of her fear of Rewolin-
ski.18 4 Thus, the jury was able to hear the victim's fear of the ac-
cused in the victim's own words. Under the Dyess standard the
question is whether the evidence likely contributed to the convic-
tion.i8 5 The mere existence of other strong evidence does not
make the admission of the evidence in question harmless error as
long as it is still likely that the evidence in question helped in any
way to convict the defendant. The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the Rewolinski case.186 It is at least possible
that they did so because they knew that Rewolinski's conviction
would stand even if they reversed the other holdings in the case.
However, the Rewolinski case now stands as precedent in Wiscon-
sin and it will affect deaf people's rights to privacy in their TDD
calls.
Part IV Public Policy Considerations
5. Rewolinski does not define its limits.
Another problem with the Rewolinski holding is that it does
not define its boundaries. The facts of the Rewolinski case may
181. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
182. 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).
183. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 413.
184. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
186. Rewolinski v. Wisconsin, 111 S.Ct. 1694 (1991).
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have compelled the decision because Rewolinski killed Teeters and
because the TDD printouts contained proof of Rewolinski's violent
tendencies. 8 7 Rewolinski, however, in addition to calling Katz
into question, sets precedent for future cases.
For example, one of the requirements of attorney-client privi-
lege is that the words be spoken in confidence. 88 Given the hold-
ing in Rewolinski that the defendant has no legitimate expectation
of privacy under the circumstances, one cannot help but think that
TDD calls from the police station are no longer covered under at-
torney-client privilege. If all of the facts of the Rewolinski case
were the same, except that Rewolinski had called an attorney in-
stead of Teeters, the Wisconsin Supreme Court majority's argu-
ments for supporting a finding of no legitimate expectation of
privacy would still apply. The court's analysis under the Fillyaw
factors'8 9 would be virtually the same. If the defendant has no le-
gitimate expectation of privacy in a call to an attorney, then it can-
not be said that the call was made in confidence. If the attorney-
client privilege does not apply, it would mean not only that the at-
torney could voluntarily testify to those words but also that she
could be compelled to do so. 190 This would be the case even if the
sheriff neither saw the TDD conversation nor took the printout
afterward.'19
The Rewolinski court also fails to limit against whom the
government can use the document once it has been taken by the
police.192 Most calls have at least two participants. If the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court is correct that the existence of a co-conversa-
tionalist always means that you know you are exposing your
call,193 then no caller can have a legitimate expectation of privacy.
It was just this kind of interpretation that Justice Harlan and the
others were worried about when they argued to remove the re-
quirement that a subjective expectation of privacy be proven.194
Another problem with Rewolinski is that none of the courts
performed a hearsay analysis on these documents. This fact leaves
the impression that TDD statements are not equivalent to other
out of court statements which are not under oath. If so, this is a
very dangerous holding for deaf people who need to use TDDs reg-
187. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
188. See INwInKELRiED, supra note 118, § 1608 at 403.
189. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
190. See INWINKELRIED, supra note 118, § 1605 at 398.
191. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
193. Rewolinaki, 464 N.W.2d at 409.
194. See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text.
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ularly. It may open the door to the use of these calls in criminal
and civil cases. It is possible that many, if not all, of the state-
ments at issue in the Rewolinski case would have been admitted
into evidence anyway but a proper analysis would have made this a
less damaging holding.
2. There are problems with using TDD printouts as
evidence.
Some TDD machines do not print the time and date of the
call on the printout. Indiscriminate use of these printouts may
make forgery of evidence possible. Without knowing the identity
of the typist or viewing the call as it occurs, the court has no
method of authenticating a TDD printout. To add to the unrelia-
bility of the printouts, the sheriff's machine in Rewolinski had
been malfunctioning by repeating words and old calls.1 9 5 The re-
peating of words may add unintended emphasis to parts of the call
and the repeating of old calls may add words that are not those of
the present callers. Since no one oversaw the calls,196 the courts
had no way of knowing whether the printouts were an accurate re-
flection of the calls. Additionally, not all machines have the same
features 197 and a person may not know about the printout feature
until he or she is suddenly confronted with a printout of a prior
call in court.
Furthermore, deaf people who speak American Sign Lan-
guage (ASL) use a different grammar structure than people who
speak English.198 The grammar of ASL may not always be under-
standable to speakers of English. 199 Some ASL sentences may
even provide an unintended meaning to speakers of English. For
example, the sentence "You come here you," to a speaker of Eng-
lish may seem to indicate an emotion of urgency or anger because
of the extra pronoun. However, this sentence to a speaker of ASL
implies no such emotion. Speakers of ASL often repeat the pro-
noun at the end of a sentence to provide clarity.200 If the courts
intend to use these TDD printouts as evidence, it would be wise
and just to provide a translator to interpret them. The Rewolinski
court, although it provided translators for the testimony, made no
mention of using experts to interpret the printouts for the jury.
195. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 411.
196. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
197. Rewolinski, 464 N.W.2d at 415.
198. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
199. Id.
200. See HUMPHIUs, supra note 8, at 15.
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3. Public policy compels a different result.
The purpose of taking and reading the printouts of Rewolin-
ski's calls was clearly not for logging. These were personal calls,
not police business. The courts proved this fact by stating that
Rewolinski could have pushed the privacy button and avoided
making the printouts. 20 L Deaf people cannot simply walk around
the corner to a pay phone. However, a hearing person who found
herself in Rewolinski's position could have walked to a pay phone
with the Katz holding to shield her privacy. 20 2 Rewolinski has
broken new ground in Fourth Amendment law: it means that po-
lice can record all calls coming to and from the station even when
the person calling is not under arrest.
20 3
Apart from the inequality of the decision, the Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)204 has made the holding of
the Rewolinski case contrary to public policy. The ADA's purpose
"is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties."20 5 Title IV of the act requires all states to set up a telecom-
munications relay service (TRS) by July 26, 1993.206 This relay
service will, using operators translating verbatim, provide a way
for deaf people and hearing people to communicate with each
other.20 7 The law makes clear that these operators must not keep
any printed record of the call beyond the call and must keep the
contents of the call private.208 Yet the deaf person using the TDD,
because of the holding in Rewolinski, may still not have a right to
privacy in a call. "The intent of Title IV of the ADA is to further
the Act's goal of universal service by providing to individuals with
hearing or speech disabilities telephone services that are function-
ally equivalent to those provided to individuals without hearing or
speech disabilities." 20 9 Despite this act, TDD machines themselves
are not widely available. Many deaf people may still find it neces-
sary to use the TDDs which federal law requires police depart-
ments to have available at their stations.2 10 Wisconsin courts have
created a blatant inequality in their treatment of searches and
201. See supra notes 59, 67 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
204. Americans With Disabilities Act, Pub.L. 101-336 (July 26, 1990) [hereinafter
ADA].
205. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
206. ADA, 47 U.S.C. § 225(c).
207. Id. at § 225(a)(3).
208. Id. at § 225(d)(1)(F).
209. Id. at § 225(a)(3).
210. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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seizures. If a hearing person uses a pay phone to call a deaf person
at a police station, or vice versa, the deaf person may have dimin-
ished constitutional rights, solely because of a disability that re-
quires the use of a TDD printout, which once seized, is admissible
against both parties to the call.211
Conclusion
Rewolinski represents a departure from search and seizure
precedent. If the Rewolinski courts had correctly balanced the in-
terests of society in the government's conduct with the privacy in-
terest asserted by the individual based on the totality of the
circumstances, they would not have placed the burden of proof
conclusively on the defendant for all cases to prove the legitimacy
of his expectation of privacy. The totality of the circumstances
standard implies full fact finding. Full fact finding requires that
the party having better access to the information relevant to an is-
sue bear the burden of proof on that issue. In addition, precedent
before the Rewolinski case had removed the property mode of
analysis from fourth amendment claims and looked towards pri-
vacy interests in the item allegedly searched or seized. The
Rewolinski decision reverses that trend. Finally, the Rewolinaki
decision has called into question deaf people's rights to confidential
TDD calls, and has created an inequality in the law's treatment of
the deaf community. Future courts must realize Rewolinski's in-
equities and decline to follow them.
211. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
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